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ABSTRACT 
This essay focuses on realism in ontology and on the problem of defining reality. According to 
the definition given by many realists, reality is independent of our thoughts, conceptual 
schemes, linguistic practices, etc. Yet, this merely negative definition of reality has some 
disadvantages: it implies a dualistic view, and it is incompatible with scientific realism. As an 
alternative, I introduce and discuss the traditional definition of reality as effectiveness, or 
capability of acting. I then attempt to determine to what extent this definition can be helpful in 
the debate concerning ontological realism. 
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I. In the last decades, philosophers have been involved in an extensive and 
animated discussion about realism. As it is well known, the word ‘realism’ appears 
in various philosophical contexts, e.g. in semantics, metaphysics, epistemology, 
morals, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of art, political theory, etc.1. 
Remarkably, in each of these fields, the word ‘realism’ assumes different, 
heterogeneous meanings. Being a realist in morals, for instance, has little or no 
influence over one’s attitude towards realism in science, and so on. Accordingly, 
realism cannot be considered an all-embracing philosophical position2. To a 
certain extent, some forms of realism might show a certain “family resemblance”, 
and the various realists possibly use certain specific sets of keywords more 
frequently than non-realists. But still, different realisms cannot be unified within 
a single doctrine. Most of those who are committed to realism within a single 
sector of the philosophical debate would not consider necessary, or even desirable, 
to embrace realism in a more general, comprehensive sense. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. P.A. French, Th.E. Uehling Jr, H.K. Wettstein (eds.), Realism and Antirealism, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988. The volume provides a survey of many 
aspects of the debate concerning realism, including moral theory. See also the recently updated 
entry by A. Miller, "Realism", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), 
E.N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/realism/>. 
2 To my knowledge, at least, no one has claimed for a substantial linkage between the above 
mentioned independent semantic domains of the word ‘realism’.  
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Nevertheless, some philosophers epitomize their own theoretical position as 
‘realism’ – sometimes as ‘new realism’ – without further specification3. This might 
prima facie suggest that they do consider many (or some) forms of realism 
connected, but this inference would not be correct. Rather, what self-declared 
realists tout court usually mean is that they are realists in metaphysics or – more 
precisely – in ontology. To put it in a nutshell, ontological realists usually assume 
that things that belong to the world ‘out there’ do not depend on our thoughts, 
mental schemes, categories, or linguistic practices, and so on. From this point of 
view, the way things occur in the world is fundamentally independent of whatever 
people may think (or not think) about it. Rather than a philosophical insight, this 
might seem a commonsensical or uncontroversial tenet4. Yet realists insist that 
many philosophers endorse the opposite view, so that realism needs to be 
reaffirmed against sophisticated anti-realistic trends in philosophy. These trends 
are typically represented by idealist or nihilist thinkers.  
One of the favorite polemic targets of the new realist wave is Immanuel Kant. 
However, Kant vehemently and correctly protested against those who 
tendentiously interpreted his thought as an ingenuous, rather than critical (or 
transcendental), form of idealism5. Although a discussion of Kant’s philosophical 
stance is not part of this work, in § 4 I shall touch upon the circumstance that 
Kant never argued for anti-realism in ontology; rather, and more interestingly, he 
claimed for a philosophy that could be free from ontological pre- assumptions. As 
far as nihilism is concerned, the analysis is no less interesting. Obviously, nihilists 
do not simply assume that nothing exists. More often, they try to challenge our 
(instinctive or cultivated) belief in the value of metaphysical notions such as 
truth, reality, good, and so on. Nietzsche’s verbal vehemence against the 
idolization of facts – as in his famous sentence “there are no facts, only 
interpretations” – must be considered within the context of the controversy 
against positivistic philosophy going on at that time6. 
                                                 
3 See e.g. M. Ferraris, Manifesto del nuovo realismo, Bari, Laterza, 2012; M. De Caro and M. 
Ferraris (eds.), Bentornata realtà. Il nuovo realismo in discussione, Torino, Einaudi, 2012; M. 
Gabriel (ed.), Der neue Realismus, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 2014.  
4 In her insightful book Realismo? Una questione non controversa, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 
2013, D’Agostini argues for the inseparability of the categories of reality and truth, so that 
(ontological) anti-realism becomes a self-confuting theory. Despite D’Agostini’s ample and well-
grounded discussion, I believe that reality and truth should be considered separately.  
5 See e.g. B. Sassen, “Critical Idealism in the Eyes of Kant’s Contemporaries”, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 35, 1997; for a textual survey, B. Sassen (ed.), Kant’s Early Critics. The 
Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Kant’s early critics, Sassen demonstrates, were puzzled by a philosophy that, in Johann Feder’s 
words, “makes objects”. As it is well known, Kants replies to them with his Prolegomena of 1783 
and in the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason (1787).    
6 F. Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke (Kritische Studienausgabe), ed. by G. Colli and M. Montinari, 
München-New York, Fischer, 1980, vol. 12: ‘Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei dem Phänomen 
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Still, realists are right in assuming that philosophers have often attempted to put 
a limit on naïve ontological realism. Some very typical problems with the 
postulates of realism are of the following kind: what is the real meaning of saying 
that the things ‘out there’ are independent of us? How are we supposed to know 
about them? How are we supposed to know about their independence from us? 
Moreover, what about ourselves? Are we merely part of this world of things ‘out 
there’? If we are indeed, what is the world of things independent from? If we are 
not, what about us as conscious or intentional entities, ontologically different 
from material things?7  
In this essay I discuss some of the problems with ontological realism and the 
concept of reality. I come to the conclusion that, unless a positive and sound 
definition of reality is provided, ontological realism runs the risk of missing its 
own target. Claiming that reality ‘does not depend’ on our thoughts, mental 
schemes, or linguistic practices is intrinsically confusing. Quite paradoxically, this 
merely negative definition of reality would be acceptable only in a dualistic 
perspective, that is, whenever one considers thoughts, mental schemes, etc. to be 
essentially different from the things “out there”. A negative definition of reality 
can be useful in some cases, but it eventually leaves too many questions 
unanswered.  
In the following pages I am going to discuss some of the arguments in the debate 
on ontological realism (§2). Then, I am going to focus on the traditional definition 
of reality as effectiveness, or capability of acting (§3). Finally, I will attempt to 
determine to what extent this definition can be helpful in the debate concerning 
ontological realism (§4).  
 
2. Despite the realists’ own intentions, ontological realism in the above described 
form tacitly posits a dualistic view of the world, in which subjectivity plays a 
central role. A definition of reality as what does not depend on human thoughts, 
mental states, etc., eventually makes this dualism inescapable. In this view, 
things and mental states are poles apart, independent one from the other. 
Ontological realists must necessarily allow for a particular kind of reality of some 
kind (call it ‘conscience’, intentionality or anyhow else), from which things are 
                                                                                                                                                                  
stehen bleibt „es giebt nur Thatsachen“, würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Thatsachen giebt es nicht, 
nur Interpretationen” (NF, Ende 1886 — Frühjahr 1887, 7[60], emphasis added). Even the 
insistence of hermeneutics upon the inescapable circle of interpretation does not seriously 
challenge the world’s existence, unless one considers hermeneutics as a form of ontology  – as 
Heidegger did, yet without denying the existence of the world.  
7 K. Fine correctly observes that “we appear to avoid the absurdities of skepticism but only by 
buying in to the obscurities of metaphysics”: K. Fine, “The Question of Realism”, Philosophers' 
Imprint, 1, 2001, 4. As a solution for this dilemma, Fine sets the concept of “ground”, which 
cannot be discussed here.  
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declared to be independent: otherwise, the negative definition of reality would 
become inconsistent.  
To resist this conclusion, the realist may add some positive element to the classical 
negative definition. Most frequently, realists appeal to perception, claiming that 
reality emerges from what we perceive. Having nothing to do with conceptual 
schemes, perception gives us direct access to reality. In this sense, realism tends to 
be also a reassertion of the independence of sensory data from further mental 
elaborations of any kind. Perceptions coming from the senses – realists say – may 
be sometimes confusing or false; yet they can never and nowhere be false. 
Descartes’ well-known doubts concerning the senses in his first Meditation may be 
attractive for armchair philosophizing, but should nevertheless be rejected, since 
they finally lead to skepticism about the external world (or, less attractively, to 
the Cartesian solution)8.  
Be that as it may, the argument of perception has two important functions. In the 
first place, it softens the negative definition of reality and turns it into a half-
negative one. Ontological realists still believe that reality is independent of our 
thoughts, conceptual schemes, etc.; yet, they concede, reality is related to another, 
non-intellectual part of our mental activity, i.e. perception. As a consequence, 
reality and perception are strongly linked together and, as such, they are 
independent of abstract thoughts, conceptual schemes, etc. In this form, however, 
ontological realism potentially clashes with scientific realism. Whether reality is 
made up of standard-size objects as shown by ordinary perception, or of 
subatomic particles, is a dilemma that cannot be eschewed9. Within the sphere of 
the present discussion, the most striking difference between scientific and 
ontological realism is that the former positively defines reality, according to what 
scientific knowledge tells us about it, whereas the latter does not. Thus, unless 
scientific realism is explicitly embraced, the realistic position remains uncertain 
with respect to a positive definition of reality.  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the perception-grounded argumentation 
works as a deterrent against any temptation to define reality. Reality –realists 
assert – has to be perceived, not ‘defined’, as if it were a conceptual construct or a 
linguistic convention. In a sense, this is an essential part of ontological realism’s 
argumentation. The very act of requiring a definition of reality ultimately reveals 
                                                 
8 As Descartes points out, we might be dreaming in this very moment, so that all of our 
representations would be false and deceptive; moreover, even if we are awake, an almighty and 
malicious god could make us erroneously believe that the world exists. Against Descartes, 
however, realists can still argue that in most cases what we see, touch, and hear, is actually 
what is there. See R. Descartes, Meditationes metaphysicae de prima philosophia, in Oeuvres, vol. 
7, ed. by Ch. Adam and P. Tannery, Paris, Cerf, repr. Vrin, 1968.  
9 For a survey of some debates concerning scientific realism see e.g. J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific 
Realism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984. A discussion of this topic lies beyond 
the scope of the present essay.  
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an anti-realistic stance; by contrast, arguing against the possibility of a definition 
of this kind is a typical realist move. In other words, asking for a preliminary 
agreement about a conceptual definition of reality is too hard a condition, that 
can be legitimately rejected by realists. Nevertheless, at some stage realists and 
anti-realists should find an agreement about the meaning they attribute to this 
contextually crucial word.  
 
3. Although it is not likely to solve the hitherto discussed problems, and despite 
the realists’ skepticism about definitions, an investigation into the meaning we 
should assign to the term ‘reality’ is a reasonable task within the general 
discussion about realism. As many other related general terms – truth, substance 
(or ‘thing’), causality, etc. – reality has been the subject of innumerable 
philosophical discussions, which cannot be resumed here. Nevertheless, a quick 
historical look at some classical definitions of reality turns out to be a helpful tool 
for our present concern.  
Within modern tradition, ‘reality’ has been often defined as ‘effectiveness’, or 
capability of acting10. In German, the word Wirklichkeit (meaning reality) and the 
verb wirken, meaning acting, having an effect on something, share the same root. 
Germans also use the word Realität for reality, sometimes with a slightly different 
meaning11. For instance, whereas many nineteenth-century philosophers use 
Realität for the subject of our discussion, Hermann Helmholtz used to talk about 
the ‘Wirklichkeit’ of the external world. For Helmholtz, things act (wirken) on our 
perceptual system, triggering our various perceptions, according to the specific 
nature of the perceiving nervous apparatus12.  
Can the definition of reality as effectiveness solve some of the problems deriving 
from ontological realism? Could a realist in ontology adopt it, and with what 
effects? As we shall see, many ontological realists would probably resist the 
temptation to define reality in terms of effectiveness, since this definition diverts 
from a static ontology of things. Nevertheless, defining reality as effectiveness or 
capability of acting has considerable advantages. In the first place, it requires no 
involvement of intentional entities, so that the above mentioned dualistic 
                                                 
10 See e.g. T. Trappe, ‘Wirklichkeit’, in J. Ritter, K. Gründer, G. Gabriel (eds.) Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Basel, Schwabe, 1971, vol. 12, cols. 829-846. The double usage of the 
latin word realitas gives raise, in modern German, to two different words: Wirklichkeit (a term 
often related to modal logic, situated between contingency and necessity) and Realität (829). 
Remarkably, the entry of the Historisches Wörterbuch concerning the reality (Realität) of the 
external world (K. Grüneputt, ‘Realität der Außenwelt’, in J. Ritter, K. Gründer, G. Gabriel 
(eds.) Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Basel, Schwabe, 1971, vol. 8, cols. 206-211) begins 
with Kant’s Refutation of Idealism.  
11 See the entry by T. Trappe, ‘Wirklichkeit’, col. 829, as quoted in the previous note. 
12 Hermann von Helmholtz, “Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung” (1878), in Vorträge und 
Reden, Braunschweig, Vieweg, 19035, transl. “The Facts of Perception,” in Selected writings of 
Hermann von Helmholtz, ed. by R. Kahl, Middletown, Wesleyan University Press, 1971. 
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implications can be avoided. Reality is neither defined negatively as ‘what does 
not depend on’ a certain intentional action, nor half-negatively as the counterpart 
of perception, but rather positively as effectiveness. Moreover, the capability of 
acting does not compel us to limit our attention to ordinary ‘material’ things, that 
is, to regular-size objects suitable to bring about perceptions in a certain subject.  
In a sense, the negative definition of reality can be regarded as a special case 
within a general phenomenology of effectiveness. In fact, the negative definition 
identifies real things on the basis of their capability of acting on a certain subject. 
Things somehow provoke perceptions in the individual, and those perceptions 
cannot be changed or influenced by the individual’s thoughts, conceptual 
patterns, etc. By contrast, the definition of reality as effectiveness does not entail 
any limitation concerning the individual upon which the effect is exerted. This has 
remarkable consequences.  
In the first place, there is no preliminary ontological distinction between subjects 
and objects, or perceiver and the perceived. Therefore, effectiveness could pertain 
to a certain thing, regardless of its being endowed or not with intentionality. With 
this move, some of the difficulties we talked about are overcome. Secondly, the 
clash between ontological commonsense realism and scientific realism is – at least 
– softened. The inevitable alternative (either standard-size objects or subatomic 
entities) posed by these two theoretic options tends to fade and to give rise to a 
unified view. Whenever a certain effectiveness is captured, no matter how 
(through ordinary perception or sophisticated scientific devices), we encounter 
reality.  
These remarks are surely far from offering a comprehensive theory. I would 
simply like to draw attention to a relatively neglected aspect of the debate, 
suggesting that further conceptual clarifications are needed concerning the very 
basic terms of the debate concerning realism.  
 
4. Notwithstanding the above mentioned advantages, I suspect that many 
ontological realists would hardly embrace a definition of reality in terms of 
effectiveness. In many cases, in fact, what is at stake in the debate about 
ontological realism is not whether one is realist or not about the external world. 
Most people and most philosophers are indeed realists in this sense. Rather, the 
debate involves taking a position on ontology and its role within the body of the 
philosophical disciplines. Should we make preliminary decisions concerning 
ontology before we make any other philosophical move? From this perspective, 
the tendency towards a ‘new realism’ actually corresponds to a revival of ontology 
as general metaphysics, that is, as a set of preliminary decisions about what exists, 
considered in its fundamental form.  
In my view, one could embrace realism without having to subscribe to 
fundamental ontology. Needless to say, ontology is an important part of 
philosophy. What should be avoided is the scholastic idea that ontology has some 
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kind of priority over (any or most) other aspects of philosophy. Formal ontology 
and regional ontologies undoubtedly give many indispensable contributions to 
phenomenology. By contrast, a general ontology implying dogmatic realism is 
much less attractive, especially when it is imbued with foundationalist 
pretensions. With this, I do not mean to advocate any form of commitment to 
anti-realism in ontology. Rather, one should subscribe to realism without 
compromising philosophical inquiries with a preliminary subdivision of the world 
into kinds or categories (the more so, if this subdivision runs tacitly), or with other 
ontological fundamental presumptions.   
A concluding historical remark concerns the kantian origin of this philosophical 
stance. Kant famously argues replacing ontology (general metaphysics) with the 
analytic of the intellect. He famously claimed that “the proud name of ontology” 
must “give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding”13. 
Interestingly, this philosophical suggestion is independent of one’s adherence to 
the other issues of Kant’s philosophical program. It is true that philosophy should 
dismiss ontological presumption, without the second part of the sentence (that a 
good substitute for ontology is the analytic of pure intellect) being also necessarily 
true14. Recent philosophical debates provide many examples of an ontological 
modesty totally disjointed from Kantian criticism. Some philosophers argue that 
the ontological presumption should be tempered by evidence coming from the 
field of psychology, or of neuroscience. Even those who don’t subscribe to this 
view may develop other strategies, nearer to traditional philosophical 
investigation. The conceptual analysis of the main terms involved – reality, to 
begin with – is surely one of the main tools available to us for these scopes.  
 
 
                                                 
13 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (A 247/B 303), transl. Critique of Pure Reason, ed. by P. 
Guyer and A. Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 345.  
14 The problem of presumption and modesty did not come to a conclusion at the time of Kant. 
See e.g. C. Wright, “Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism” (1987) in P.A. French, 
Th.E. Uehling Jr, H.K. Wettstein (eds.), Realism and Antirealism, Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988, 25-49 (25). 
